Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.
Introduction
Questions regarding honesty and deception have been at the heart of many iconic episodes of human history. The Watergate hearings, for example, revolved around the now-famous question of willful deception on part of the Nixon White House: 'What did the President know and when did he know it?' At the neural level, early interest in (dis)honesty stemmed from attempts to develop methods of distinguishing the truth from lies in forensic and legal settings [1 ,2] . These include, among others, efforts to improve criminal justice (e.g., by identifying perpetrators) and intelligence analysis (e.g., by predicting terrorist activity).
Guided by these goals, early studies, typically using the Comparison Question Test (CQT) or Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), sought to identify a set of physiological (e.g., arousal) or neurocognitive (e.g., anxiety, guilt) processes that could serve as objective markers of deception [3] [4] [5] [6] . In the GKT, participants view pieces of information that are either relevant or irrelevant to the target incident, and physiological responses are compared during exposure to items that only someone with knowledge of the target incident should recognize as relevant versus to other items [7] .
Comparing lie versus truth-telling conditions, these studies repeatedly found differential responses in regions of the prefrontal cortex previously associated with cognitive control and higher-order cognition [8 ,9-14] . Recent meta-analyses have further shown that lying was associated with greater activation in regions including dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior insula and superior frontal lobule (Figure 1) [1 ,15 ,16] . Strikingly, no brain region has been consistently found to respond more during truth-telling than to lying, a finding often interpreted as supporting the notion that deception is a more cognitively demanding than truth-telling.
Despite their popularity, however, there is growing dissatisfaction with past studies inspired by the CQT and GKT approaches [1 ,17 ] . The most commonly cited criticism centers on the fact that participants were often instructed by the experimenters to deceive or withhold information [1 ,17 ] . This, however, raises important questions regarding the external validity of studies using 'instructed deception'. In particular, by removing from participants their ability to choose to deceive, instructed deception paradigms make it challenging if not impossible for experimenters to study the involvement of motivational and decision-making processes in deception.
Honesty and deception in ethology and economics
Behaviorally, studies of honesty and deception have their roots in ethology and economics, owing to the importance of honesty and deception to problems of mate selection, predator avoidance, and economic exchange, among others. At the heart of both literatures is the idea that honesty and deception are properties of the communicative signals that organisms send to one another in the service of some economic or evolutionary 
